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CaseNo.20080128-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
Leroy Worthen, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Reply Brief of Petitioner 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT BRANDI'S HATRED 
FOR AND ANGER TOWARD HER ADOPTIVE PARENTS IS A 
MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL CONDITION FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 
506(d)(1), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
In Points I-DI of his Brief of Respondent, defendant repeatedly asserts that 
Brandi's hatred for and anger at her adoptive parents is a mental or emotional 
condition for purposes of the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient 
privilege, and that this alleged mental or emotional condition motivated her to 
fabricate the instant charges of aggravated sexual abuse. See, e.g., Resp. Br. at 20,22-
23, 26, 27, 33-34, 36. Brandi's hatred for and anger at her adoptive parents may 
constitute a motive to fabricate, but they are not a mental or emotional condition. 
Defendant's contrary assertion fails for two reasons. First, defendant "conceded" 
below "that the record does not support a finding that there is a reasonable certainty 
that [Brandi] is mentally unstable," and the trial court agreed. R114; see also R i l l 
("Defendant has conceded that there is not reasonable certainty concerning the 
alleged victim's mental condition") (a copy of the Ruling and Order is attached). 
Second, as explained in the State's opening brief, feelings of hatred and anger do not 
constitute a mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). See Pet. 
Br. at 19-32. 
A. Defendant conceded below—and the trial court found—that 
Brandi does not suffer from a mental or emotional condition. 
As set out in the State's opening brief, one of the showing's defendant must 
make under rule 506(d)(1) is that the privileged "communication[s]" he seeks are 
"relevant to an issue of the physical, mental, or emotional condition of the patient." 
Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1); see also Pet. Br. at 10-32, 42-43. Defendant has not and 
cannot make this showing on this record. 
The trial court granted in camera review in this case, but not because it f ound 
that Brandi suffered from a mental or emotional condition that effects "her ability to 
accurately perceive, remember, or relate events in her life." R114. To the contrary, in 
accepting defendant's concession that Brandi was not "mentally unstable," the trial 
court expressly found that the record was devoid of evidence that Brandi suffered 
from any mental or emotional condition that affected her trustworthiness: 
2 
There is no information in the record [that] would support such a 
findingf,] [that Brandi] suffers from a disorder [that] affects her ability 
to accurately perceive, remember, or relate events in her life. There is[,] 
further[,] no information that the complainant suffers from a disorder 
[that] would affect her ability to be trustworthy. The Court will 
therefore deny the request to review in camera her mental health 
records to see if there is information [that] may be exculpatory with 
respect to these issues. 
R114. 
Nevertheless, the trial court did grant in camera inspection in this case, based 
on its determination that Brandi's records "will contain statements made by the 
complainant concerning her feelings, whether positive or negative, toward her 
parents/7 R112. And the court of appeals affirmed: "The trial court granted 
[defendant's motion for the sole purpose of determining whether evidence existed 
that would illuminate [her] feelings toward her parents." State v. Worthen, 2008 UT 
App23,I7,177P.3d664. 
But rule 506 does not recognize any "feelings" exception to therapist-patient 
privilege. See Utah R. Evid. 506(d). Moreover, as explained in the State's opening 
brief, a patient/victim's mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule 
506(d)(1), "means something that requires diagnosis or treatment." Sussman v. 
Sussman, 146 P.3d 597,603 (Haw. 2006) (analyzing Hawaii's element of a claim-or-
defense exception in child custody case) (quotation marks omitted). It does not 
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mean undiagnosed feelings of any kind, whether they be of anger or hatred, or both. 
See, e.g., Edward J. Imwinkelreid, "The New Wigmore: Evidentiary Privileges § 6.13.3, 
1001 (2002) (advocating that a "'condition' denotes a longer-lasting physical or 
mental state than momentary 'emotion,' 'feeling,' or pain'"); see also Pet. Br. at 19-22. 
B. Neither Cardall nor Blake supports defendant's assertion that 
Brandi's feelings of anger and hatred constitute a mental or 
emotional condition. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant cites State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51,982 
P.2d 79 and State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, 63 P.3d 56 in support of his claim that 
Brandi's anger and hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition. See Resp. Br. 
at 19-28. Defendant's reliance on these cases is misplaced. 
Defendant's reliance on Cardall is unavailing for two reasons. First, unlike 
this case, there was some indication in the Cardall record that the complainant in 
that case suffered from a mental or emotional condition. 1999 UT 51,129. Second, 
while Cardall, like defendant, asserted that the complainant was lying, unlike 
defendant, Cardall did not assert that the complainant was lying because she hated 
or was angry with him. Id. 
As set out in the State's opening brief, Cardall asserted that the complainant 
in that case lied about the rape allegation against him because she was "a habitual 
liar,... mentally and emotionally unstable," and had lied "on at least one previous 
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occasion... about an attempted rape or sexual touching by the school janitor/' Id.; 
see also Pet. Br. at 14-15. On appeal, this Court agreed that the complainant's 
"mental and emotional state [was] an important element of Cardall's defense." Id. at 
131 (citing Utah R. Evid. 506(d)(1)); see also Pet. Br. at 14-15. Cardall thus appears to 
hold that the complainant's asserted mental instability in that case qualified as a 
mental or emotional condition for purposes of rule 506(d)(1), and that it was also an 
"important element of Cardall's defense." Id.; see also Pet. Br. at 14-15. 
Here, while defendant, like Cardall, initially attempted to show that Brandi 
had a mental or emotional condition, he ultimately conceded that Brandi was 
mentally stable, and the trial court agreed. R114; see also R i l l . As noted above, the 
trial court expressly found that there was no evidence that Brandi suffered "from a 
disorder which affects her ability to accurately perceive, remember, or relate events 
in her life." R114; see also Pet. Br. at 6,42-43. This alone is grounds upon which to 
distinguish the result in Cardall. Unlike this case, there was apparently some 
indication in the Cardall record that the complainant was "mentally and emotionally 
unstable,"or that she suffered from a relevant mental or emotional condition. 1999 
UT 51, f 29 (discussing rule 506(d)(1)). But given defendant's concession below that 
Brandi is mentally stable, and the trial court's consequent findings, there is no 
similar basis for finding that Brandi suffers from a mental or emotional condition for 
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purposes of rule 506(d)(1). See R114; see also R i l l . Cardall does not, therefore, 
support defendant's contention that Brandi suffers from a mental or emotional 
condition. 
Cardall is further distinguishable on the ground that Cardall did not assert 
that the complainant in that case was motivated to lie because she hated or was 
angry at him, but rather, only that the complainant had lied because she was a 
habitual liar. 1999 UT 51, \ 29. Therefore, although the Court found that the rule 
506(d)(1) exception applied in Cardall, it was never asked to decide whether feelings 
of hatred or anger may constitute a mental or emotional condition under rule 
506(d)(1). Cardall thus offers no support for defendant's assertion that Brandi's 
feelings of anger and hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition for purposes 
of rule 506(d)(1). 
Defendant's reliance on Blake is as misplaced as his reliance on Cardall. Blake 
does not support defendant's assertion that feelings of hatred and anger are a 
mental or emotional condition under rule 506(d)(1), because Blake did not consider 
whether this exception to the therapist-patient privilege applied in that case. As set 
out in the State's opening brief, the Court reiterated in Blake that any request for in 
camera review of victim mental health records begins with rule 506 and whether the 
records fall into one of its exceptions. Blake, 2002 UT 113,1117-18; see also Pet. Br. 
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at 13,17. And if the defendant clears this first hurdle, he must then clear a second 
hurdle by showing that there is a reasonable certainty the records contain 
exculpatory information. Id. at f f 17-24 (discussing Cardall, 1999 UT 51); see also Pet. 
Br. at 13,17. Failure to clear either hurdle defeats a request for in camera review of 
privileged records. Id.; see also State v. Gomez, 2002 UT 120, \ \ 14-15, 63 P.3d 72 
(holding no exception to statutory privilege for rape crisis center counselors applied; 
trial court had no authority to compel victim or center to produce records for in 
camera review). 
But the Court did not determine whether Blake had cleared this first, or 
specific exception hurdle by showing that the rule 506(d)(1) exception applied. See 
id. at I f 17-18. Rather, the Court expanded on the second, or reasonable certainty 
hurdle. See id. at H19-22. Because the Court ultimately determined that Blake had 
not cleared this second hurdle, it had no need to revisit the first hurdle, or to directly 
address whether Blake had also shown that the sought-for records fell within the 
rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient privilege. Id. at \ 19 n.2. 
Nevertheless, it did so. But the Court did not address the meaning of the 
terms "mental[ ] or "emotional condition" as used in rule 506(d)(1). Rather, the 
Court looked solely at the meaning of the phrase "element of a claim or defense." 
Blake, 2002 UT 113, f 19 n.2. And, taking a step away from the apparent holding in 
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Cardall, that impeachment evidence is an element of a claim or defense, see 1999 UT 
51, f 31, the Court observed in dicta that "[i]t [was] unlikely that impeachment 
evidence qualifies as an element of a claim or defense." Blake, 2002 UT 113, f ! 19 
n.2; see also State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, \ \ 42-43,125 P.3d 878 (same). Thus, Blake 
and Gonzales limit Cardall insofar as that case held that impeachment evidence is an 
element of a claim or defense. But Blake says nothing about whether feelings of 
anger or hatred constitute a mental or emotional condition. Therefore, Blake, like 
Cardall, offers no support for defendant's assertion that Brandi's feelings of anger 
and hatred in this case constitute a mental or emotional condition. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT MOTIVE OR 
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE IS AN ELEMENT OF A DEFENSE FOR 
PURPOSES OF RULE 506(d)(1), OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
EVIDENCE 
Notwithstanding the above, in Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that 
because Brandi's feelings of hatred and anger, or motive to fabricate, is exculpatory 
evidence, it is necessarily an element of his defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). 
See Resp. Br. at 32 ("If this case is viewed upon with the defense establishing that we 
know why [Brandi] is lying then certainly that basis for her lying becomes an 
element or a claim of this defense"). In support, defendant again cites Cardall and 
Blake, and additionally cites Codianna v. Morris, 594 P.2d 874 (Utah 1979). Id. at 30-
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32. But just as Cardall and Blake do not support defendant's assertions that feelings 
of hatred and anger constitute a mental or emotional condition, they do not support 
his assertion that Brandi's feelings of anger and hatred are an element of his defense. 
Nor does Codianna. 
First, as shown above, defendant's reliance on Cardall is unavailing because 
that case must now be viewed through the lens of Blake and Gonzales. The court of 
appeals read Cardall to suggest that the impeachment evidence sought in that case 
was an element of Cardall's defense and that it thus sufficed to pierce the rule 506(b) 
privilege. However, this Court in Blake and Gonzales, read Cardall much more 
narrowly. For the reasons set forth in the State's opening brief, the Court should 
continue in the direction of Blake and Gonzales and clarify once and for all that mere 
impeachment evidence is not an element of a defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). 
See Pet. Br. at 19-48. 
Second, defendant's reliance on Blake borders on the frivolous. Defendant 
asserts that Blake supports his argument that impeachment evidence qualifies as an 
element of his "'we know why she's lying'" defense. See Resp. Br. at 32 
(capitalization and bolding omitted); see also id. at 33. But the Court stated in Blake 
that "[i]t is unlikely that impeachment evidence qualifies as an element of a claim or 
defense." Blake, 2002 UT 113,f19 n.2. Defendant's error again stems from his 
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failure to understand that privileged records—like those protected by rule 506—are 
protected by two high hurdles in Utah. 
As explained, a defendant seeking privileged records must show both that 
they fall within an exception to the privilege, and that there is a reasonable certainty 
that the records contain exculpatory information. See Pet. Br. at 13; see also Blake, 
2002 UT 113,H17-24 (discussing Cardall, 1999 UT 51). Failure to clear either hurdle 
defeats a request for in camera review of privileged records. Id.; see also Gomez, 2002 
UT 120,111445. 
Here, defendant quotes the Court's discussion in Blake of the kinds of specific 
facts that must be alleged to establish the second, or reasonable certainty hurdle: 
"At a minimum, specific facts must be alleged. These might include 
references to records of only certain counseling sessions, which are 
alleged to be relevant, independent allegations made by others that a 
victim has recanted, or extrinsic evidence of some disorder that might 
lead to uncertainty regarding a victim's trustworthiness. This listing is 
not intended to be exclusive, but is only an example of the type and 
quality of proof needed to overcome the high Cardall hurdle/' 
Resp. Br. at 32 (quoting Blake, 2002 UT 113,122). Defendant posits that because the 
above examples are also examples of impeachment evidence, they are necessarily 
elements of a claim or defense under rule 506(d)(1). Resp. Br. at 33 ("Are these not 
examples given us by this Court in Blake, that create exculpatory evidence 
supporting an element of a claim or defense and also have the ability to impeach the 
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witness?"). But defendant's assertion begs the question. The fact that Blake 
identifies examples of impeachment evidence that may suffice to establish the 
second, or reasonable certainty hurdle, does not answer the question of whether 
impeachment evidence suffices to establish the first, or specific exception hurdle. 
For the reasons set forth supra at pages 1-8 of this reply brief, and in the State's 
opening brief at pages 13-32, it does not. 
Finally, defendant's reliance on Codianna is similarly unavailing. Codianna is a 
discovery case, not a privilege or exception-to-privilege case. Codianna thus 
involves a discussion of materiality, i.e., whether the non-disclosed motive evidence 
in the case had a reasonable probability of effecting a different outcome. 594 P.2d at 
875-76; see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (defining material 
evidence as evidence having a reasonable probability of effecting a different 
outcome); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,681-82 (1985) (same). But Codianna 
says nothing about whether motive or impeachment evidence is an element of a 
claim or defense for purposes of piercing any privilege, including rule 506(d)(1). For 
example, Codianna filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that the 
prosecution withheld non-privileged evidence that one of his codefendants had a 
motive to kill the victim. Codianna, 594 P.2d at 875. Codianna claimed that this 
evidence supported his defense theory, was contrary to the State's theory, and also 
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"generally and specifically exculpatory to [Codianna]." Id. This Court remanded the 
case to the district court for a plenary hearing on "whether there [had] been any 
withholding of material evidence from which there is any reasonable likelihood that 
there may have been a different result, either as to the verdict rendered, or upon the 
sentence imposed," but expressed no view as to the correctness of Codianna's 
claims, or the "materiality" of the alleged motive evidence. Id. at 876-77 (citing 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)). 
Codianna, therefore, does not support defendant's assertion that motive or 
impeachment evidence is an element of a claim or defense for any purpose, let alone 
for purposes of the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the therapist-patient privilege at issue 
here. 
Rather, Codianna stands for no more than the unremarkable proposition that 
non-privileged motive or impeachment evidence may be material, or potentially 
exculpatory, such that it must be turned over to the defense. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 
678 (holding suppression of impeachment evidence required new trial, "only if the 
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial"). Codianna does not support the sweeping generalization that 
all impeachment evidence relates to the emotional condition of the victim and is also 
an element of a claim or defense for purposes of rule 506(d)(1). As explained, a 
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victim's motive to fabricate is not a mental or emotional condition; nor is it an 
element of any claim or defense. See Pet. Br. at 20-29 (analyzing rule 506(d)(1)). 
Defendant consequently fails to show that the rule 506(d)(1) exception to the 
therapist-patient privilege applies here. See Gonzales, 2005 UT 72, i f 42-43; Blake, 
2002 UT 113,119 n.2. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION THAT THE SECOND-HAND 
IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE HE SEEKS IN BRANDTS PRIVILEGED 
THERAPY RECORDS IS NOT CUMULATIVE TO THAT WHICH HE 
ALREADY POSSESSES IN HER PERSONAL DIARY 
The State does not dispute that defendant has shown a reasonable certainty 
that Brandi's therapy records contain exculpatory evidence, or additional statements 
of Brandi's feelings of hatred and anger toward her adoptive parents. See Pet. Br. at 
33; see also Worthen, 2008 UT App 23, f 24. But this showing is inadequate for 
intrusion into her mental health records, even in camera. As set out in the State's 
opening brief, defendant is not entitled to in camera review. The only impeachment 
evidence he has identified to a reasonable certainty is cumulative and relevant only 
to the undisputed point that Brandi hates both of her adoptive parents; it is thus 
constitutionally immaterial. See Blake, 2002 UT 113, % 23 (holding "evidence is 
deemed material where there is a reasonable probability that, if the evidence is 
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disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding will be different" (citing 
Cardall, 1999 UT 51,130)); see also Pet. Br. at 33-37. 
Defendant concedes that he seeks only additional evidence of Brandi's 
feelings of hatred and anger toward her parents. See Resp. Br. at 36. Nevertheless, 
he asserts that Brandi's privileged therapy records are not cumulative. Resp. Br. at 
37 ("Clearly[,] obtaining more information about the potential hatred of [Brandi] 
toward her mother between journal entries is not cumulative7'). But defendant's 
characterization of the impeachment evidence he seeks as non-cumulative does not 
make it so. 
To establish that this evidence is non-cumulative, defendant must show that 
the additional motive evidence he seeks is "different from that available elsewhere," 
and thus "independently probative." State v. Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d 719,724 (Wis. App. 
1993); see also Pet. Br. at 34-37 (discussing Shiffra and People v. Stanaway, 521 N.S.2d 
557(Mich. 1994)). As explained in the State's opening brief, the psychological records 
sought in Shiffra, though cumulative of impeachment evidence in Shiffra's 
possession, were also deemed to be independently probative because they may have 
confirmed the victim's mental health problems. See Shiffra, 499 N.W.2d at 723-724. 
In Stanaway, the psychological records actually contained the best evidence of the 
child-victim's motive to fabricate, in the form of a hand-written note "to her 
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mother's live-in boyfriend," the contents of which was disputed by the parties. See 
Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d at 576-577 n.44. Thus, the psychological records at issue in 
Shijfra were viewed as a psychiatric backstop to the lay opinion evidence Shiffra 
already possessed and therefore had "independently probative" value. 499 N.W.2d 
at at 724. And in Stanaway, the child-victim's records were deemed non-cumulative 
because the parties disputed the contents of her hand-written note, the only copy of 
which was apparently contained in the therapy records. 521 N.W.2d at 577 n.44. 
Defendant has not and cannot make similar showings on this record. See Pet. 
Br. at 33-48. Defendant cannot show that Brandi's therapy records are necessary to 
confirm a mental or emotional condition because he has already conceded that 
Brandi is mentally stable. See R114, Ri l l ; see also Pet. Br. at 42-43. And defendant 
cannot show that Brandi's therapy records are necessary to establish her motive to 
fabricate because the State concedes that Brandi has a motive. See Pet. Br. at 33. 
Indeed, defendant already possesses Brandi's first-hand account of the anger and 
hatred she feels toward her parents as recorded in her personal journal. See Pet. Br. 
at 42-43. Given these circumstances, Brandi's therapy records lack any 
independently probative value. 
Here, instead of attempting to show that Brandi's privileged records contain 
independently probative evidence, defendant broadly asserts that the "'prosecutor 
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must disclose to the defense psychological evidence' about the 'government 
witness whenever that evidence can substantially affect defense counsel's ability to 
impeach the witness/" Resp. Br, at 35 (quoting State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 32,979 
P.2d 799 (bolding in original)). Defendant's reliance on Bakalov is misplaced. 
Bakalov is a discovery case and did not involve any claim of privilege. The 
only psychological evidence at issue in Bakalov was turned over to the State by the 
rape victim and her private therapist, no claim of privilege was asserted. Id. at f f 
33-38. The State does not dispute that exculpatory psychological evidence in its 
possession must be turned over to the defense. See Pet. Br. at 30-31; see also State's 
discussion of Codianna, supra. Because the State does not possess Brandi's privileged 
therapy records, Bakalov does not assist defendant's quest to obtain them. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the court of appeals' opinion and remand to the 
trial court with instructions to withdraw the order granting in camera review of 
Brandi's privileged counseling records.. 
Respectfully submitted 29 October 2008. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
mt 
DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Petitioner 
17 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on October 2008, two copies of the foregoing brief were 
J^mailed • hand-delivered to: 
JOHN J. E ASTON 
ALLAN & EASTON 
1892 North 1120 West 
Provo,Utah 84604 
Counsel for Respondent 
MARTHA PIERCE 
OFFICE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM 
450 South State Street, Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0403 
Counsel for Alleged Juvenile Victim 
A digital copy of the brief was also included: wOfes • No 
/Vi^/vy^ \JKnfik 
18 
Addendum 
Addendum 
FILED 
, DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
AUG 0 2 2935 
JOAHHEMicKEE CLERK 
VW DEPUTY 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEROY WORTHEN, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 051800543 
JUDGE A. LYNN PAYNE 
This matter is before the Court on "'Defendant's Subpoena 
for Medical and Therapy Records," filed on May 03, 2006. The 
State's opposition was filed May 10, 2006. The Defendant's re-
ply was filed June 30, 2006. The Court notes that the time 
frame for arguing this issue has not been observed by the Defen-
dant's counsel. The Defendant's reply should have been received 
by the Court no later than June 16, 2006, at the latest. De-
fense counsel is instructed to observe the time limits imposed 
by the Court in the future. 
The Defendant is seeking to subpoena certain medical and 
therapy records of the alleged victim of the sexual abuse 
charged against the Defendant. Generally speaking, such records 
are privileged. Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 506(b). However, 
the rule is subject to certain exceptions, one of which is Utah 
Rule of Evidence Rule 506(d)(1). In construing this exception, 
the Supreme Court of Utah has held that "there are situations in 
which otherwise privileged communications between a crime victim 
and her therapist might be subject to in camera review and dis-
closure." State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113, f 19 (citing State v. 
Cardall, 1999 UT 51, 51 29-35) . The Court then outlined the 
standard whereby a court is to determine whether the exception 
applies. A defendant "must show, with reasonable certainty, 
that the sought-after records actually contain exculpatory evi-
dence which would be favorable to his defense." Blake, 2002 UT 
113, 5 19 (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). The 
Court then attempts to quantify "reasonable certainty" as "on 
the more stringent side of more likely than not." Jd. at 1 20 
(internal quotation omitted). With the legal standard identi-
fied, the Court now turns to the Defendant's request. 
I. MENTAL INSTABILITY 
At the hearing in this matter held May 03, 2006, the Defen-
dant conceded that the record does not support a finding that 
there is reasonable certainty that the alleged victim is men-
tally unstable. The Court agrees. There is no information in 
the record which would support such a finding with respect to 
allegations that the complainant suffers from a disorder which 
affects her ability to accurately perceive, remember, or relate 
events in her life. There is further no information that the 
complainant suffers from a disorder which would affect her abil-
ity to be trustworthy. The Court will therefore deny the re-
quest to review in camera her mental health records to see if 
there is information which may be exculpatory with respect to 
these issues. 
II. DENIAL OF ABUSE 
The Defendant has also requested a review of the records to 
determine whether the complainant ever denied sexual and / or 
physical abuse during her interaction with therapist or other 
medical professionals. To support the request for the records 
of Dr. Jones, and physician at Ashley Valley Medical Center, and 
Brenda Bowman, a counselor with the Northeastern Counseling Cen-
ter, the Defendant indicates that "It is believed by the alleged 
victim's mother that Brenda Bowman specifically asked the victim 
if she was being sexually abused by anyone . . . ." A mere be-
lief is not sufficient to support the request. Further, it ap-
pears to the Court that the Defendant's request for such infor-
mation is based upon the fact that the complainant's mother was 
present while the health care professionals questioned the com-
plainant. If this is the case, such statements are themselves 
privileged and cannot be divulged, as the patient has the right 
to prevent anyone present during the interview from disclosing 
any information obtained at that time. 
Similarly, the Defendant argues that the complainant never 
claims to have been abused by the Defendant while being treated 
at the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric Institute (U.N.I.)• 
Again, there is no basis given for the statement which would 
support a finding of "reasonable certainty." 
With respect to the issue of whether the records of Carolyn 
Henry should be reviewed, any statement made to Ms* Henry by the 
complainant while in the presence of her mother is again privi-
leged. The Court disagrees with the Defendant's conclusion that 
the presence of a mother of a minor child is outside the privi-
lege afforded by Rule 506. The rule specifically includes ". . 
. guardians or members of the patient's family who are present 
to further the interest of the patient becaus,e they are reasona-
bly necessary for the transmission of the communications, or 
participation in the diagnosis and treatment . . . ." Utah R. 
Evid. 506(b)(3). 
Finally, with respect to the request to review the records 
of Northeastern Counseling Center, the Defendant relies upon 
statements made by the complainant to Karen Douthit in therapy 
sessions. Again, these are privileged for the same reasons 
given above. Further, the Defendant merely states that "it was 
learned [from Kirk Harris] that the alleged victim in a therapy 
session with Karen Douthit . . . made new allegations of abuse . 
. . ." This is a mere conclusion of what Mr. Harris may have 
said. 
Based upon review of the record before the Court, there is 
no information upon which the Court can make a finding that 
^reasonable certainty" exists that the complainant denies being 
sexually abused. This is based upon the Court's ruling that any 
statements made during therapy or to a treating physician are 
privileged and incapable of supporting a finding of reasonable 
certainty. Without such reasonable certainty, the Court cannot 
grant the Defendant's request. Therefore, the Court will deny 
the request as it relates to denials of abuse. 
III. RELATIONSHIP CHARACTERIZATION 
The Defendant also requests any statement concerning the 
complainants relationship with her parents. The Defendant al-
leges that the complainant was sexually abused in the home of 
her natural parents and was removed from that home after she re-
ported the sexual abuse. The defense theory here is that the 
complainant was motivated to lie about abuse by the Defendant in 
order to be removed from her adoptive home. Without going to 
great lengths to analyze the issue, the Court will agree with 
the Defendant that where the Defendant has provided information 
which shows that there is "reasonable certainty'7 that the mental 
health records would contain exculpatory evidence concerning mo-
tive, an in camera review of the records would be appropriate. 
To support the finding of reasonably certainty, the Defen-
dant relies upon thirteen diary entries. These entries express 
the complainant's frustration with, and hatred toward, her par-
ents. The entries also include a threat to kill her parents if 
they continue to treat the complainant in a particular manner in 
the future. Some of the entries were written contemporaneously 
with the requested counseling records and do provide the Court 
with "reasonable certainty" that the requested records will con-
tain statements made by the complainant concerning her feelings, 
whether positive or negative, toward her parents. 
Based upon the record, the Court will order an in camera 
review of all the records requested by the Defendant to discover 
any statements concerning the complainant's feelings toward her 
parents. This review is not intended to reveal her statements 
concerning the conduct of her parents, unless the complainant 
specifically relied upon the conduct as a justification for her 
feelings (i.e., "I hate my mom / dad because she / he . . . . ," 
uMy dad / mom did and I love him / her for it," etc.). 
The focus of the review will be on assessing the complainant's 
feelings regarding her parents. 
The problem here is that in this case the Court has author-
ized a review of the records for a fairly limited purpose and 
has specifically found that there is no justification for a re-
view for other purposes. Therefore, the Court does not propose 
that the entire record be reviewed by the judge. The Court will 
only review those statements regarding the complainant's feel-
ings toward her parents. To limit the amount of information 
presented to the judge, the Court will direct the law clerk to 
review the record and highlight all relevant statements. The 
Court will then review only the highlighted statements. This 
process will facilitate a limited review of the records for the 
specific purpose identified above. 
To review, the Defendant has conceded that there is not 
reasonable certainty concerning the alleged victim's mental con-
dition. He is therefore not entitled to have the Court review 
the records in their entirety for that purpose. The Court has 
also found that there is no basis for a review concerning any 
denials of abuse. Therefore, the Defendant's request as it con-
cerns that issue will also be denied. The Court does find "rea-
sonable certainty" that the requested records will contain in-
formation regarding the complainant's feelings toward her par-
ents. Therefore, the Court will grant the Defendant's request 
for the records, but will not disclose any of the contents of 
the records until the Court has had a chance to review them in 
camera. As stated above, to restrict the review to its proper 
purpose, the Court will rely upon the law clerk to highlight 
only the relevant portions of the record. This should not be a 
difficult task for the law clerk. It further has the advantage 
of limiting the review to the specific evidence which justified 
the review. Any objections to this process must be filed with 
the Court within ten (10) days. 
ORDER 
Therefore, based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the Defendant's request is GRANTED IN PART, as outlined in 
the ruling. 
Dated this / day of m^^oJ^ , 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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